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Among the judges on the U.S. courts of appeals, Judge Richard Cudahy
stands out for his experience in and writings on energy law. In this Essay, we
argue that Judge Cudahy's energy opinions elaborate on two recurring themes
in US. energy law: judicial humility and deference for subnational innovation.
At the same time, these themes present a deference tension: where federal
regulators disapprove of state regulatory policies, courts may confront a
conflict between deferring to federal regulators and encouraging subnational
energy policy innovations. We argue that in such cases, Judge Cudahy 's
decisions point towards a principle offavoring the outcome that best supports
the system-wide welfare of the electric grid. This principle has important
implications for contemporary energy issues in the United States, especially for
renewable and clean energy policy.
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Introduction
Among the judges on the U.S. courts of appeals, Judge Richard Cudahy
ranks among the most experienced in matters of energy regulation and among
the most prolific on legal matters of interest to the energy industry. A native
f Harry M. Walborsky Professor and Associate Dean for Research, Florida State University
College of Law.
tt Associate, Van Ness Feldman, P.C. The views expressed in this Essay are not necessarily
shared by Van Ness Feldman or its clients.
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Wisconsinite, Judge Cudahy attended West Point and served in the United
States Army Air Corps before joining the Yale Law School class of 1955.1
After many years of private practice and teaching, 2 he served as the Chairman
of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission from 1972-75. Among other
milestones, his chairmanship produced the Madison Gas decision,3 a case with
mundane origins that ultimately came to represent the advent of the intentional
design of electricity pricing to encourage moderation in consumption. Judge
Cudahy has written numerous articles and given many talks on energy industry
developments over a career spanning many decades.
Judge Cudahy's career has witnessed sweeping changes in the industry
and its regulation. Beginning with the energy shocks of the late 1970s,
policymakers embarked on a relentless march away from vertically integrated,
monopolistic natural gas and electric utilities and toward competitive energy
markets. Judge Cudahy's opinions have addressed numerous issues of
significance for energy law along this path, including the deregulation of
interstate natural-gas transportation,4 the wholesale abandonment of nuclear
power plant construction on the heels of the 1979 Three-Mile Island disaster,
and in a recent and important decision discussed below, the efforts by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to modernize the electrical
grid..
Judge Cudahy's sincere pleasure in crafting energy law decisions is
readily apparent to anyone who tracks his opinions. One example is his
majority opinion in City of Kaukauna v. FERC,7 which interpreted the terms of
a series of nineteenth-century conveyances of property along Wisconsin's. Fox
River. The case presented the opportunity for a discourse on the history of
Judge Cudahy's native state, from its European discovery by Jean Nicolet in
1634, through the troubled nineteenth-century efforts to build canals connecting
the state's waterways and the give-and-take conveyances surrounding its entry
into the Union in 1848. The opinion also features a discussion of the basic
mechanics of hydropower, as a predicate to resolving the question of whether
I. See History of the Federal Judiciary-Cudahy, Richard Dickson, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=540&cid=999&ctype-na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 8,
2012).
2. Judge Cudahy practiced energy law at isham, Lincoln & Beale, and taught energy law at
George Washington University and Marquette University. See id
3. Madison Gas & Elec. Co., Docket No. 2-U-7423, 5 P.U.R. 4th 28 (Wisc. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Aug. 8, 1974).
4. See Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 852 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1988) (en
banc) (Cudahy, J., concurring).
5. In re Wabash Valley Power Ass'n, 72 F.3d 1305 (7th Cir. 1995).
6. Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2009) (Cudahy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).




the United States or Wisconsin possesses certain rights in hydropower derived
from the Fox River.8
Judge Cudahy's opinions consistently illustrate two principles of great
significance for energy law: judicial humility on matters of economic
regulation and a deferential brand of federalism that encourages states to act as
laboratories for regulatory innovation. In this Essay, we explore the cases that
illustrate these two principles in Judge Cudahy's energy jurisprudence. We also
discuss the importance and implications of each of these principles in the
context of the modem energy industry, which Judge Cudahy has helped to
shape. We conclude by recognizing that, in some instances, there will be
tension between these two principles. We suggest that Judge Cudahy-or a
similarly-minded judge-would be inclined to resolve such discord in a manner
that favors innovation over conventional approaches to energy regulation and
technology.
I. Judicial Humility in Economic Matters
A. The Judicial Humility Principle
Judge Cudahy's opinions reflect a philosophy of judicial humility in
economic matters that is rooted in an understanding that judges are not as adept
as administrative agencies at addressing complex and technical regulatory
problems. This approach is not, of course, rooted in a belief that administrative
agencies are invariably correct in their decisions and policy choices, 9 but
simply that they are in a better position than judges to balance policy values
and legal obligations and to make the required judgment calls on matters
requiring expertise. Such an attitude is certainly not unique to Judge Cudahy,
but its frequent recurrence in his opinions illustrates his keen understanding and
endorsement of principles that can be traced to the Supreme Court's rejection
of substantive due process in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas
Co.10 and the subsequent post-New Deal trend of judicial deference to
economic regulation.
8. Another colorful example is Stone & Webster Engineering Co. v. Herman, 115 F.3d 1568
(7th Cir. 1997), in which Judge Cudahy surveys the unfortunate history of a particularly fire-prone
nuclear plant. See id. at 1569 ("Browns Ferry is no stranger to the danger of fire. In 1975, a fire at the
plant failed (narrowly) to cause a meltdown, but did result in the coining of an industry byword for a
disastrous conflagration. . . . [I]n 1996, after the events in this case, an unused cooling tower burned
up.").
9. See Richard D. Cudahy, Retail Wheeling. Is This Revolution Necessary?, 25 ENERGY L.J.
161, 166 (2004) ("Can planners be wrong? Of course. Can regulators be ignorant, timid, political, or
even venal? Unfortunately, yes.").
10. 320 U.S. 591 (1944). Hope largely withdrew the courts from the business of utility rate
determination by eliminating any inquiry into the appropriateness of the regulator's methodology and by
prescribing instead that courts focus only on whether the methodology produced just and reasonable
pricing. Id. at 602 ("It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total effect of the
rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the [Federal Power] Act is
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We believe that Judge Cudahy's years on the Wisconsin Public Service
Commission gave rise to his optimism about the efficacy of regulation
generally and his respect for the determinations of expert energy regulators in
particular. Likewise, Judge Cudahy's skepticism about the economic prowess
of judges has led him to defer to the initial decisions of administrative
authorities. As a result of these two attitudes, Judge Cudahy has frequently
dissented from the views of his colleagues in favor of deferring graciously to
regulators. Yet this willingness to accord deference has never led to mere
rubber-stamping of regulators' decisions. Judge Cudahy has been prepared to
part ways with an agency's reasoning, especially where the question is not one
peculiarly within the ken of the agency. Thus, in City of Kaukauna, Judge
Cudahy vacated a decision by FERC, finding its interpretation of an 1872
property deed to be implausible.1 2 FERC may be an expert in matters of energy
regulation-in this case, the question of whether the 1920 Federal Power Actl3
granted the federal government the right to be reimbursed by downstream dam
owners for improving waterways-but FERC's interpretation of an archaic
document, unrelated to energy law and policy, was not especially
authoritative. 14
Judge Cudahy's skepticism regarding judicial economic expertise is
amplified in energy cases, where his keen understanding of the challenges of
energy regulation has increased his willingness to question economic
assumptions and rationales that originate from the bench rather than from
regulators.' 5 Put another way, his positions acknowledge the special problems
at an end."). Hope put an end to the substantive due process inquiry of Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 468
(1898), according to which "the basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates to be charged
... must be the fair value of the property being used by [the utility] for the convenience of the public,"
as ascertained in light of a laundry list of financial and economic factors, see id. at 546-47.
11. See, e.g., Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 576 F.3d at 482 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("I think FERC may be in a better position to implement a policy leading to prompt
improvement in a deficient transmission grid than this court, focused as it is on the inevitable complaints
of utilities demanding more for their money."); New England Power Co. v. FERC, 533 F.3d 55 (1st Cir.
2008) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) ("The majority has called for another remand in this stale case to give the
Commission an additional opportunity to restate the conclusion it has already emphatically declared in
its ruling on New England Power's (NEP's) petition for clarification and rehearing. The result reached
by the Commission here is entirely fair .... .").
12. 214 F.3d at 900.
13. 16 U.S.C. § 803(f) (2006).
14. City ofKaukauna, 214 F.3d at 899; see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. FERC, 765 F.2d 686, 690
(7th Cir. 1985) ("We owe some deference to the Commission as an expert body dealing regularly with
natural gas supply contracts. Nonetheless, our deference is not nearly so marked as it would be in
reviewing a purely regulatory determination of the Commission.") (citation omitted). Judge Cudahy has
also been prepared to reject agency conclusions where the agency's figures are tainted by inaccuracy or
where its reasoning bears hallmarks of post-hoc rationalization. See, e.g., Van Abbema v. Illinois, 807
F.2d 633, 643 (7th Cir. 1986) (vacating in part an environmental impact statement by the Army Corps of
Engineers relating to a coal facility because the agency's reasoning was "obscured by a record of
miscalculations followed by recalculations apparently intended only to bolster a decision already
made").
15. See, e.g., Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 479 (7th Cir. 2009) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("However theoretically attractive may be the principle of
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of the energy industry: capital investments are enormous and must be
committed years and even decades before the infrastructure enters service; fuel
and electricity costs vary wildly based on unpredictable events; and utilities
must meet unrelenting demands for energy production.
The influence that Judge Cudahy's firsthand knowledge of energy
regulation has had on his judging is especially evident in the recent Illinois
Commerce Commission case. This seminal decision was one of the first to
address FERC's efforts to allocate the costs of building new interstate
transmission infrastructure to accommodate new generation capacity, including
renewable resources such as wind power. In his dissent from the majority's
decision rejecting FERC's cost allocation approach, Judge Cudahy recognized
that, in cases affecting the electrical transmission grid, courts chartered to
resolve binary disputes have the potential to issue decisions that are vexatious
to the broader public interest, which is the power grid's raison d'8tre.16
Therefore, it seems to follow a fortiori that regulators charged with protecting
the interests of the system deserve deference from the courts.
Underlying Judge Cudahy's humility in the context of energy policy is a
belief that economics, as a discipline, does not always produce the best
solutions for heavily-regulated industries providing public services. This belief
that economic theory should not be the sole framework for energy regulation
does not stem from any particular economic attributes of the energy industry
(such as its character as a "natural monopoly" capable of extracting
monopolistic rents), but rather from its character as one of a handful of
"infrastructure industries" that implicate broader public interests.17 Decisions
affecting such foundational industries are best made with an eye toward the
industry's public purpose, rather than toward an economic theory that
prioritizes tallying up the precise costs and benefits attributable to each party
involved in the system. This conviction is reflected in Judge Cudahy's
academic writing as well as his judicial opinions.' 9
'beneficiary pays,' an unbending devotion to this rule in every instance can only ignite controversy,
sustain arguments and discourage construction while the nation suffers from inadequate and unreliable
transmission."); id. at 482 ("Pro rata assignment of costs eliminates not only lawsuits but nitpicking
controversies of every sort and delays standing in the path of action. From that point of view, I think
FERC may be in a better position to implement a policy leading to prompt improvement in a deficient
transmission grid than this court, focused as it is on the inevitable complaints of utilities demanding
more for their money."); Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d 891, 899 (7th
Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (questioning the assumption that a utility's ability to pass
along costs to customers would chill its enthusiasm for bringing a lawsuit against an antitrust violator,
because "[u]nder the practical facts of regulation [an Illinois utility] would ordinarily have a greater
incentive to bring this litigation than economic theory suggests").
16. Ill. Commerce Comm n, 576 F.3d at 482.
17. See Cudahy, supra note 9, at 164.
18. See id. ("The foundational nature of the electric power industry is important because the
more a technology like electricity goes to the roots of the economy, the more it spawns . . . social
benefits and social costs which do not figure in conventional economic analyses of the system
employing the technology."); see also Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of Competition and
Regulatory Policy, 16 ENERGY L.J. 419 (1995) (arguing that the purposes of the Public Utility
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B. Implications of the Judicial Humility Principle for the Seventh Circuit's
Brand ofEconomic Theory
As one might expect, Judge Cudahy's skepticism about the judiciary's
expertise in economic matters has been a source of conflict with other Seventh
Circuit judges, who have been more ambitious in applying economic theory to
law. The Judge has not shied away from acknowledging this intellectual
friction with his colleagues. In one particularly memorable dissent, he chided
his colleagues for assuming that "any efforts to protect the weak against the
strong would, through the exhilarating alchemy of economic theory, increase
rather than diminish the burden upon the powerless." 20
Judge Cudahy's skepticism regarding the judiciary's economic aptitude,
however, is rooted in more than a mere distaste for the contemporary Seventh
Circuit's particular brand of economic theory. Judge Cudahy has shown similar
concern for what he views as unwarranted economic determinism even in cases
where the offending certitude was not informed by orthodox liberal economic
theory. One good example is found in an antitrust case, Loeb Industries v.
Sumitomo Corp., which arose out of Sumitomo's manipulation of the copper
market.21 By the time the case reached the Seventh Circuit, it was well-
established that Sumitomo had engaged in a premeditated scheme to game the
copper market by "hoard[ing] vast supplies of physical copper for the purpose
of restricting supply," then "call[ing] in shorts to raise copper demand to
inflated levels," thereby "forc[ing traders] to cover their positions by acquiring
physical copper at inflated prices." 22 Judge Diane Wood, writing for the
majority, was willing to accept that certain manufacturers had been injured by
the inflated price of copper, despite having no direct dealings with Sumitomo,
because "the prices of [copper] and [copper] futures 'tend to move in
lockstep."' 23 Judge Cudahy viewed this concession as overly credulous of the
plaintiffs' arguments and wrote separately to "question the appropriateness of
finding a 'lockstep' relationship between the copper futures and cash markets
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 include not only market competition but also conservation and
efficiency).
19. See Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 576 F.3d at 482 (noting "the urgency of the need to build
transmission and the need for incentives to that end," and arguing that "[p]ro rata assignment of costs
eliminates not only lawsuits but nitpicking controversies of every sort and delays standing in the path of
action").
20. See Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970
F.2d 273, 283 (7th Cir. 1992) (Cudahy, J., dissenting); see also Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169,
1182 (7th Cir. 1987) (Cudahy, J., concurring in the judgment and concurring in part) ("I believe at
several points in the majority opinion the moral underpinnings of the law are at risk in the sweep of the
economic analysis.").
21. 306 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2002).
22. Id.




. . . . In contrast to the majority, Judge Cudahy would have been more
cautious about departing from the general rule that the only party legally
injured by an antitrust violator is the direct purchaser.25 Thus, even in cases that
are difficult to classify along traditional ideological lines, Judge Cudahy has
served to remind his colleagues on the Seventh Circuit of the dangers of
attributing certainty to economic theories and of the limited economic aptitude
of the judiciary.
C. Future Implications for Energy Law
The idea of judicial humility regarding economic questions will take on
particular importance in the field of energy regulation in the coming years, as
the country contemplates a systemic modernization of the electrical grid and a
major transformation of the sources supplying its electricity. Of course, it
remains to be seen whether such initiatives will be undertaken vigorously at a
national level. Federal legislation is not a sine qua non of upgrading the
electrical grid, however, and significant and costly electrical grid projects are
already underway. For instance, any significant wind or solar generation project
built in response to a state renewable portfolio standard will affect the operation
of the electrical system due to the variable nature of wind and solar power, as
will any high-voltage transmission line intended to access power from far-flung
renewable sources or to reduce transmission constraints around urban areas. As
the high-voltage transmission project at issue in Illinois Commerce Commission
v. FERC exemplifies, each grid-modernization project imposes costs, and
therefore presents for regulators the touchy question of how to allocate those
costs among the numerous parties affected.
Judge Cudahy's characteristic solicitude toward energy regulators takes
on particular importance in view of its divergence from circuit court attitudes in
recent grid-modernization cases. In three recent decisions related to the siting
of transmission lines, appellate courts have not shown deference towards
regulators in any sense of the word. In one of these cases, Illinois Commerce
Commission, Judge Cudahy is on record dissenting from the majority opinion
as insufficiently deferential to FERC and as unduly preoccupied with precise
26
cost allocation. In the other two cases, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits
effectively gutted an important new power conferred on the Commission by the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 to issue federal permits for transmission projects
(the so-called backstop siting authority). The Fourth Circuit rejected FERC's
377
24. Id. at 498 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part); see also
id. at 499 (describing the "lockstep" idea as "more a slogan than a fact" under certain circumstances).
25. See id. at 499 (citing Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977)).
26. See supra notes 11 & 15-16 and accompanying text.
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broad interpretation of its backstop powers,27 while the Ninth Circuit
undermined the very foundation of the FERC's authority by vacating the U.S.
Department of Energy's prerequisite national study of areas of transmission
congestion.28 In combination, the two cases have sent the Commission back to
the drawing board. Each case produced a dissent from a circuit judge who
contended that the agency's interpretation of its statutory mandate should be
accorded greater deference. 29 Thus, the question of the appropriate degree of
deference is an increasingly important one in energy regulation, and Judge
Cudahy has staked out a prominent position among the judges favoring
deference to expert regulators.
The challenge of finding the appropriate degree of deference to regulators
will be further complicated in the coming years by the growing role played by
non-governmental regulators with authority over multistate territories. These
industry bodies, known as regional transmission organizations (RTOs), have
emerged with FERC's encouragement 30 and are now taking a lead role in initial
cost-allocation decisions for projects with systemic benefits. Despite their non-
governmental status, they are undeniably expert and are charged with seeing to
the public interest.31 Thus, the key question for future cases involving RTOs
will be: What is it about traditional energy regulators that earns them deference
before the courts? This question will need to be answered, implicitly or
explicitly, in order to decide whether the new supra-state regulators are equally
deserving of deference despite their non-governmental nature.
In sum, the question of the degree of judicial deference owed to energy
regulators in economic matters is an unsettled question with major implications
for the direction of the industry. Federal courts have a long tradition of
deferring to agencies in matters of economic regulation, but as the three
transmission-related cases discussed above highlight, such deference is hardly
guaranteed by reviewing courts. Judge Cudahy's opinions should serve as a
27. See Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 309-10 (4th Cir. 2009) (clarifying
that FERC can only intervene where state authorities have taken no action on a proposed project for a
year, and that it has no authority where state authorities simply reject the proposal).
28. See Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011).
29. See id. at 1107 (Ikuta, J., dissenting) ("[T]he DOE erred by not consulting with affected
states at the threshold of a massive, yearlong, nationwide study of electric transmission congestion. But
this error was harmless. Petitioners have not shown that DOE's error prevented them from . . . making
arguments to DOE, nor have they shown that DOE would have made a different decision absent the
error. In short, they have failed to offer even a scintilla of evidence to establish prejudice."); Piedmont,
558 F.3d at 320 (Traxler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I believe that FERC correctly
interpreted [the backstop siting provision] . . . to include the failure or refusal to grant a permit
application for more than one year in cases in which the permit application was denied . . . .") (internal
citation omitted).
30. See Stephen Ferrey, Goblets of Fire: Potential Constitutional Impediments to the
Regulation of Global Warming, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 835, 878 (2008).
31. See generally Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration
ofthe Public Interest in the Governance and Accountability ofRegional Transmission Organizations, 28
ENERGY L.J. 543, 544-49 (2007) (examining the history of FERC's mandate to advance the "public




reminder to courts that a few important decisions hewing to economic humility
and deference could go a long way in securing the success of the national effort
to upgrade our energy grid, along with other important energy infrastructure
priorities.
II. Subnational Policy Innovation
A. The Subnational Policy Innovation Principle
Many of Judge Cudahy's opinions reflect an optimism about innovation
by subnational governmental bodies-especially states. Justice Brandeis
famously celebrated in his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann the fact
that "a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
,,32
country . . . . New State Ice involved a classic question of economic
regulation-state licensure of businesses affected with the public interest-so it
is not surprising that Judge Cudahy, a former state regulator who himself
oversaw some important innovations in regulatory policy, has taken inspiration
from Justice Brandeis's account of states as laboratories.33 Thus, when a
Seventh Circuit majority headed by Judge Richard Posner declared the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 to be the exclusive method for telephone
network interconnection, Judge Cudahy dissented, noting "the strong
presumption against preemption of state law." 34 The majority held that federal
law requiring states to arbitrate price disputes preempted state efforts to avert
such disputes by requiring utilities to file an ex ante tariff.35 By contrast, Judge
Cudahy advocated a more nuanced approach that would allow state
commissions to regulate prospectively.36
Judge Cudahy's energy law opinions have similarly expressed his
enthusiasm for allowing state regulators to innovate against the backdrop of
federal law. When the Seventh Circuit struck down Illinois's favorable
regulatory treatment of environmental controls that enabled generators to use
sulfur-intensive Illinois coal without offending the Clean Air Act, Judge
Cudahy concurred, but "with significant reservations"; 37 in particular, the Judge
observed that "the assurance of rate base treatment for [technology that]
provide[s] a capability for using Illinois coal[] seems a tenuous basis for
32. 285 U.S. 262, 386-87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
33. Judge Cudahy quotes New State Ice directly, albeit outside the context of economic
regulation, in McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 1981), in which the court approved of a
Wisconsin requirement that a district attorney sign a written stipulation to the admission of the results of
a polygraph test.
34. Wis. Bell, Inc. v. Bie, 340 F.3d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 2003) (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 444 (Posner, J.).
36. Id. at 449 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
37. Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 599 (7th Cir. 1995) (Cudahy, J.
concurring).
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finding a violation of the [dormant] Commerce Clause." 38 In another case,
involving the interaction between state environmental regulation and federal
nuclear waste regulation, Judge Cudahy complained that the majority "finds
preemption much too easily," and accused the majority of "seeking out a
conflict where one does not necessarily exist in order to bolster its shaky
argument for preemption." 39
In his scholarly writings, Judge Cudahy has also focused on the
importance of state autonomy in connection with energy diversification. 40 The
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 197841 (PURPA) requires utilities to
purchase electricity from certain qualifying non-utility generation projects, at a
price equal to the purchasing utility's "avoided cost." In the 1990s, FERC
decided that PURPA effectively preempts California's regulatory scheme
allocating wholesale contracts based on "benchmark prices," which included a
requirement that approximately half the capacity be set aside for renewable
bidders.4 2 Judge Cudahy expressed skepticism about FERC's conclusion that
PURPA preempts California's approach to calculating avoided cost rates,
noting the decision's implications for conservation and diversification of
energy resources across the country. His analysis reminds us that, while
PURPA did embrace competition as one of its goals, "both fuel diversity and
energy conservation might be completely ignored if the only emphasis in
evaluating generation is on current market price."43 In fact, as Judge Cudahy
correctly observed, PURPA did not embrace a one-size-fits-all nationalistic
approach to encouraging innovation, but instead embraced a more nuanced
cooperative-federalism scheme in which states played a crucial role in
advancing the basic values of the statute.44 While the Energy Policy Act of
200545 reformed PURPA to address some of the problems Judge Cudahy
highlighted, his analysis of the tension between state regulators in advancing
conservation and innovation values under PURPA remains relevant today.
B. Future Implications for the "Smart Grid" and Renewables
While Judge Cudahy's federalism opinions in the energy context have
rarely garnered a majority on his court, they nonetheless lay out important
38. Id. at 598.
39. Brown v. Kerr-McGee, 767 F.2d 1234, 1246 (7th Cir. 1985) (Cudahy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
40. See Cudahy, supra note 18.
41. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645
(2006)).
42. See So. Cal. Edison Co., 71 F.E.R.C. 161,269 (1995); 70 F.E.R.C. 161,215 (1995).
43. Cudahy, supra note 18, at 421.
44. Id at 436 ("When PURPA was adopted, Congress tended to defer to state authority, the
traditional vesting place for regulatory authority over electric utilities.").





principles for modem energy regulation. Much discussion of energy markets
and climate change focuses on federal regulation as a solution. Judge Cudahy,
however, seems keenly aware of the traditional role played by state regulators
and of the incompleteness of federal jurisdiction related to energy resources.
His approach would leave states considerable leeway to address both economic
and environmental regulation of energy resources, resulting in deference to
state solutions that are challenged on preemption grounds. This approach has
important implications for the future of energy regulation in the United States
and for the role of subnational institutions in the values of energy law.
To begin, allowing states considerable leeway to experiment encourages
innovative approaches to conservation and environmental regulation. It is well-
chronicled that states have taken the lead in climate change policy innovation,
while the federal government has lagged in both legal solutions and policy
approaches.46 In the case of electric power, since states retain jurisdiction over
retail rates, state regulatory innovations are essential to encouraging
conservation. Such innovations are hardly a new development: Judge Cudahy's
chairmanship of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission in the 1970s saw
the adoption of innovative regulatory approaches, including a rate structure that
moved away from fixed rates based on cost-of-service and toward more active
metering of energy prices based on use.4 7 While the former system incentivized
consumption, often featuring a price that declined as consumption increased,
the latter system is designed to send appropriate price signals to discourage
unneeded consumption. In what has become a classic article on the
development of dynamic pricing, Judge Cudahy and the economist Robert
Malko described the "flattening" of the prior "declining block" pricing
structure in the Madison Gas decision, as a "way station on the . . . road to
time-of-day pricing."Ag
Judges must be aware of the critical role state regulators play in
effectuating conservation policy. For example, as a part of a broad energy and
climate change policy, the Obama Administration has embraced "smart
grids"-power distribution and metering systems that will improve the sharing
of information to realize system efficiencies. But federal regulators lack
authority to require utilities to adopt smart grids on their own, as retail pricing
and metering by utilities remain firmly within the jurisdiction of state
regulators. Policies such as those Judge Cudahy helped to design in the 1970s
continue to be of great importance as states experiment with smart grid policies
46. See David Adelman & Kirsten Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1894 (2008); Anne E.
Carlson, Energy Efficiency and Federalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 63 (2008),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/107/carlson.pdf
47. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co., Docket No. 2-U-7423, 5 P.U.R. 4th 28 (Wisc. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Aug. 8, 1974).
48. Richard D. Cudahy & J. Robert Malko, Electric Peak-Load Pricing: Madison Gas and
Beyond, 1976 WISc. L. REV. 47, 74-75.
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that will make time-of-day and real-time pricing a reality. A preemption
jurisprudence that is too quick to preclude states from investing in new
metering technologies or adopting innovative pricing policies to encourage
conservation could forestall such developments altogether.
Judicial attitudes towards state innovation will also impact the ability of
states to encourage investment in renewable energy. In the past decade, many
states have experimented with feed-in tariffs that require utilities to purchase
power from renewable projects in order to encourage the development of such
projects. As in the 1990s, FERC has weighed in with a decision that PURPA
limits state rate-setting powers in this arena.49 Judge Cudahy's judicial and
scholarly writings serve as reminders that excessive preemption may
undermine states' efforts to manage fuel diversification and energy
conservation, and it may ultimately impair the development of renewable
energy resources.
C. Future Implications for Transmission Cost Allocation
Although Judge Cudahy has been somewhat skeptical of procompetitive
deregulation, his scholarly work and opinions have predicted the rise-as a
consequence of deregulation-of national markets and regional approaches to
energy govemance. His opinions recognize some practical limitations to
regulation at the state and national levels in the context of regional markets and
highlight the resulting significance of regional governance approaches-
especially where both state and federal regulators have limited jurisdiction.
For example, federal regulators have limited jurisdiction to require local
utilities to pay for upgrades to interstate transmission infrastructure with
regional benefits,50 while state regulators lack the ability to require customers
outside their jurisdiction to share in the costs of transmission upgrades. The
emergence of mid-level regulatory bodies such as RTOs thus permits Judge
Cudahy to reject a one-size-fits-all national approach to transmission cost
allocation, while recognizing that regional challenges such as the planning,
siting, and pricing of transmission cannot depend solely on the decisions of
state regulators. Such solutions might depend on the approval of federal
49. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 132 F.E.R.C. 61,047, at 1 67 (holding that California's
feed-in tariff program is not preempted by the Federal Power Act or PURPA as long as the generating
facilities in question are "Qualifying Facilities" under PURPA, and the tariff rates "do[] not exceed the
avoided cost of the purchasing utility"), clarified and reh'g dismissed, 133 F.E.R.C. 61,059 (2010).
Although the Commission framed its decision as creating space for California to implement its tariff
system without preemption, see id., 133 F.E.R.C. 61,059, at T 5, its consequence is that a state feed-in
tariff must operate within the strictures of the federal PURPA regime. See generally Jim Rossi, Clean
Energy and the Price Preemption Ceiling, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 247 (2012) (arguing
that interpretations of PURPA as a price preemption ceiling thwart subnational efforts toward energy
conservation and adoption of cleaner energy sources).
50. See Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39





regulators, as occurred when FERC approved the cost allocation method of the
Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) RTO that was rejected in Illinois
Commerce Commission,5 but it also depends on states' willingness to
authorize participation in regional solutions as a way of experimenting in the
multistate context.
We view Judge Cudahy's partial dissent in Illinois Commerce
Commission as an application of Justice Brandeis's idea of states as
laboratories to a regional, supra-state context, insofar as it would have allowed
an RTO comprised of utilities from multiple states to experiment with new
ways of allocating transmission upgrade costs incurred in pursuit of grid-wide
reliability.52 By advocating the extension of the state policy experimentation
prerogatives described in New State Ice to RTOs, Judge Cudahy recognized
that these multijurisdictional organizations will be increasingly responsible for
important energy policy decisions-and that with respect to certain issues, the
states will have a correspondingly smaller role. 53
III. Resolving the Deference Tension in U.S. Energy Law
As a parting thought, we consider and attempt to resolve an apparent
tension between the dual principles we have identified in Judge Cudahy's
jurisprudence: deference to the economic expertise of energy regulators and
deference to states acting as laboratories for energy policy innovations. When a
court is asked to review the decisions of state regulators, there is no tension
between the two principles-in fact, the decision under review would be
entitled to a sort of dual deference. But in the typical case, federal courts are
asked to review the decisions of federal regulators. In such a case, deference to
regulators will not always encourage subnational innovation-and may even
undermine it. How should a state regulatory policy disapproved by federal
regulators fare in court under these two principles? While this question cannot
be answered definitively in the abstract, we think that a few generalizations are
possible in light of Judge Cudahy's energy jurisprudence. We think that Judge
Cudahy and any like-minded judge would resolve this tension pragmatically by
recognizing that federal energy statutes are enacted to serve multiple values,
51. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 119 F.E.R.C. 1 61,063 (2007), reh'g denied, 122 F.E.R.C.
61,082 (2008).
52. See Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 479 (7th Cir. 2009) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. Judge Cudahy's dissent also emphasized the voluntary nature of RTO membership. See id.
("Concerns about the real value to individual utilities of the stability and efficiency provided by
improvements to the backbone grid are answered by their voluntary participation in the power pool and
its collaborative . . . planning[] process."). In other words, whereas the strongly preemptive majority
opinion views all subnational regulation monolithically, Judge Cudahy would consider aspects-like
voluntariness, consensus, and the ability to participate in RTO govemance-that heighten the legitimacy
ofnon-federal decision-makers.
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favoring flexibility in institutional approaches, and seeking to promote the
ability of subnational institutions to innovate.
In these situations, a subnational regulator's purpose in enacting a
particular policy will likely be important to its treatment by a reviewing court.
Subnational policies can diverge from federal policies, or meet with the
disapproval of federal regulators, for several reasons. Sometimes jurisdictions
champion local interests, assigning lower priority to costs and benefits outside
their jurisdiction. 54 In other cases, states or RTOs accept greater local costs
when attempting to set a model for other states or the federal government, or
with the intention of being as prepared as possible for future contingencies. 5
We think that, all other things being equal, regulation in the latter vein-which
views federal regulation as a minimum to be improved upon-would fare better
in the eyes of Judge Cudahy.
In other words, it seems that Judge Cudahy sees the system-wide welfare
of the electrical grid as a value served by federal law, and he furthermore
believes that federal law ordinarily establishes a floor-not a ceiling-for this
value. This federal-floor approach encourages policy innovation by authorizing
subnational regulators to accept heightened costs in the interest of regional
benefits. In contrast, efforts to avoid the local costs of projects endorsed by
federal regulators and featuring system-wide benefits are viewed with a
jaundiced eye, as potential affronts to the federal floor. While nothing in federal
law requires such a specific allocation of responsibility between the federal
government and the states in setting transmission prices, we are unaware of any
54. For instance, in 2003-05, Kentucky and Virginia policymakers sought to prohibit or delay,
respectively, utility AEP's efforts to transfer control of its transmission lines to the PJM RTO. See
Energy Bar Ass'n, Report of the Electric Utility Regulation Committee, 26 ENERGY L.J. 217, 220-21
(2005). The Virginia legislature passed a law temporarily forbidding the transfer, and then FERC issued
an order purporting to invalidate Virginia's statute under PURPA, concluding that it was impermissibly
motivated by economic protectionism. New PJM Cos., 107 F.E.R.C. ? 61,271, if 62,216-28 (2004). The
matter was ultimately settled after both Virginia and Kentucky agreed to the transfer, while extracting
additional conditions. See Press Release, Am. Electric Power Co., Virginia SCC Action Paves Way for
AEP To Join PJM Interconnection Oct. 1 (Aug. 30, 2004),
http://www.aep.com/newsroom/newsreleases/?id= 1145; Press Release, Electric Power Supply Ass'n,
Kentucky PSC Gives Kentucky Power the Go-Ahead To Join PJM; Estimated Net Benefits of $13.4
Million Anticipated (May 27, 2004), http://www.epsa.org/forms/documents/DocumentFormPublic/
view?id=378B00000000. For a discussion of another instance of localism in transmission line siting, see
Jim Rossi, Transmission Siting in Deregulated Wholesale Power Markets: Re-Imagining the Role of
Courts in Resolving Federal-State Siting Impasses, 15 DUKE ENVrL. L. & POL'Y F. 315, 316-19 (2005).
55. In Illinois Commerce Commission, for instance, the PJM RTO determined to spread the
cost of a certain "backbone" transmission project, and the majority of the RTO's constituent utilities
apparently agreed that this cost allocation was appropriate. See Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 576 F.3d at 479
(Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Cudahy would have allowed the RTO and
its constituents to undertake the shared cost. Id. Another example is California's policy of setting aside
for renewable projects one-half of the opportunities under PURPA to participate in the grid as a
"qualified facility." See Cudahy, supra note 18, at 430; supra note 49 and accompanying text.
California's policy amounted to a voluntary undertaking of heightened rates in exchange for increased
development of renewable energy sources, which is consistent with PURPA's goal of improving fuel
diversity. See Cudahy, supra note 18, at 421-22 (discussing PURPA's goal of stimulating energy





reason why a federal appellate judge should not view electricity-related cases
through this lens. The "federal floor" is a familiar idea in energy regulation56
and is particularly common in environmental regulation-another area where
local authorities may undervalue regional benefits and thereby produce results
that are inefficient in a system-wide context. And although sometimes this
federal-state relationship is clearly envisioned in a statute, it is usually best
articulated in judicial precedent.57 Thus, it is not uncommon for the task of
expressly identifying a federal floor to fall to the courts. Whether or not Judge
Cudahy would explicitly embrace this federal-floor approach to interpreting
energy statutes, it certainly seems to reconcile the apparent tension described
above, and provides guidance to future judges impressed by the dual principles
of economic humility and subnational innovation that Judge Cudahy has
embraced and refined in his years on the bench.
56. For instance, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation is empowered by the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 to set reliability standards for the electrical grid, subject to domestic
oversight by FERC, see Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1211(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824o (2006), but regional
electric reliability councils are empowered to set more detailed or stringent regional standards. See, e.g.,
Rule 312-Regional Reliability Standards, in N. AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP., RULES OF
PROCEDURE OF THE NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION 15 (2011), available at
http://www.nerc.com/files/NERC Rules-of Procedure EFFECTIVE_20110412.pdf ("Regional entities
may propose regional reliability standards that set more stringent reliability requirements than the NERC
reliability standard or cover matters not covered by an existing NERC reliability standard."). For another
example, federal renewable portfolio standard proposals have envisioned a "federal floor" scheme,
whereby more rigorous state renewable portfolio standards would not be preempted by the federal
legislation. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 101(a) (as
passed by House, June 26, 2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
Illhr2454eh/pdf/BILLS-111hr2454eh.pdf (amending PURPA to require FERC to implement a
renewable portfolio standard while "preserv[ing] the integrity, and incorporat[ing] best practices, of
existing State and tribal renewable electricity and energy efficiency programs . . . ."); see also NAT'L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE PROPOSED FEDERAL RENEWABLE
ELECTRICITY STANDARDS, at v (2009), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/45877.pdf
(stating that each of three federal renewable electricity standard proposals "aims to prevent preemption
of, or interference with, existing state [renewable energy standard] mandates that meet or exceed the
federal requirement").
57. Under both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, states may enact stricter standards
than those imposed by the EPA. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption,
and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1565-66 (2007). Neither statute, however,
mentions a federal "floor" or expressly describes that allocation of power between the federal and state
governments. See 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2006) (describing "State authority" under the Clean Water Act); 42
U.S.C. § 7416 (2006) (describing the "Retention of State authority" under the Clean Air Act).
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